[Lampshade111]

Recently I stumbled upon a website which, while Sparkyesque in layout, claimed that Major Reno and Captain Benteen knowingly refused to come to Custer's aid. Despite the site's layout, there was some interesting references and supposed quotes.

http://custer.over-b...e-13946750.html

According to them, in a 1879 Court of Inquiry regarding the battle, the U.S. Army decided to back Reno and Benteen despite changed testimonies, altered maps, and other falsified information. They argue that since then, Custer's personal reputation, and his reputation as a military commander, have been attacked and slandered unjustly by various sources.

So what do you guys think? Does Custer deserve this reputation of an incompetent glory hound who cared little for his men? Or was he dishonored and disgraced by men wanting to save their careers?

[thekirk]

If you read some of the background to Custer's tenure in the 7th, you can almost understand why he'd be a victim of a 19th-century fragging. The man was a prima-donna ass, in a lot of respects. Reading accounts of his command, I can't help but think he'd have been challenged to innumerable duels, a century earlier. He was very cliquish, and extremely political. Some of the stuff going on that I read in memoirs made the 7th Cavalry sound like a very bad high-school drama, not a professional military organization.

Then, there was the whole political atmosphere surrounding him. I doubt that there was a vast, far-reaching conspiracy against him, but I'm also pretty sure nobody in Washington, D.C. was too terribly upset that he got himself killed, either. More than a few probably heaved sighs of relief.

Was there a cover-up, about what actually happened? Hard to say--I don't think anyone really had the facts, and a lot of the facts weren't really even available until the entire "Custer Little Bighorn Military-Historical Complex" got going, long after the battle. If all the details had been available, the whole investigation/aftermath would have gone very differently. As it was, the higher-ups were operating in a very information-deficient atmosphere.

This post has been edited by thekirk: 21 December 2009 - 1827 PM

[Skywalkre]

Lampshade111, on Mon 21 Dec 2009 2250, said:

Does Custer deserve this reputation of an incompetent glory hound who cared little for his men? Or was he dishonored and disgraced by men wanting to save their careers?

After serving in the the 7th Cav I would've never guessed he's viewed in a negative light. <_<

[Mike Steele]

Skywalkre, on Mon 21 Dec 2009 1758, said:

After serving in the the 7th Cav I would've never guessed he's viewed in a negative light. <_<

If you served in the 2Cav (particular 2nd Squadron) you would view him as favorable as well. Since he declined the 2nd Squadron as "didn't need em". I have a feeling he regretted that decision. :lol: The 4 Gatlings probably missed as well. :P

[aevans]

Lampshade111, on Mon 21 Dec 2009 2250, said:

So what do you guys think? Does Custer deserve this reputation of an incompetent glory hound who cared little for his men? Or was he dishonored and disgraced by men wanting to save their careers?

Incompetent glory hound. People who try to rehabilitate Custer conveniently forget that the 7th Cavalry weren't the only troops on that campaign. Custer should have been content to gain and maintain contact until at least one of the other two columns in the area could converge on the Indian main body.

[Tommy Bennett]

Weren't Benteen and Reno pretty much pinned down by detachments sent to engage them? From what I've seen and read of the enemy accounts, there wasn't time to reinforce or relieve the main body due to the rapidity of their demise.

[aevans]

Tommy Bennett, on Tue 22 Dec 2009 0356, said:

Weren't Benteen and Reno pretty much pinned down by detachments sent to engage them? From what I've seen and read of the enemy accounts, there wasn't time to reinforce or relieve the main body due to the rapidity of their demise.

Both Benteen and Reno made quicker, more accurate assessments of their local situations, and the overall situation, than Custer did. It wasn't just a question of time, but of practical inability to move to Custer's aid. They had all they could handle on Reno hill.

[Tuccy]

Tommy Bennett, on Tue 22 Dec 2009 0456, said:

Weren't Benteen and Reno pretty much pinned down by detachments sent to engage them? From what I've seen and read of the enemy accounts, there wasn't time to reinforce or relieve the main body due to the rapidity of their demise.

Tony does not mean Benteen and Reno by the two columns I think, rather the infantry, if I understand him correctly.

Anyway splitting already overwhelmed force into three groups was another mistake that could've easily ended in the total destruction of 7th Cav - luckily Reno and Benteen assessed that the mission was FUBAR and retreated soon enough to just barely get away.

[Ariete!]

Every 'colonial European' nation had its Little Big Horn. The Brits in Africa (more than once), Italy at Adwa and elsewhere. I'll bet there are a couple of French ones but I don't know them. They stemmed from racial arrogance (fighting savages) and usually occurred soon after said 'savages' got their hands on decent weaponry thereby reducing much of the vaunted superiority of the white folks.

[aevans]

Tuccy, on Tue 22 Dec 2009 0748, said:

Tony does not mean Benteen and Reno by the two columns I think, rather the infantry, if I understand him correctly.

The Gibbon and Cook columns had more cavalry than infantry between them. Terry's column, of which the 7th Cavalry was the major component, also had a couple of companies of infantry. But, yes, what I mean is that Custer should have waited until the balance of the Terry column, or the Gibbon column, had shown up. Of course, Terry and Gibbon were much more level-headed officers, and would have viewed an attack on such a large Indian camp as a rash undertaking. Either one would have probably taken up a defensible position and waited for the Indians to attack or disperse.

[aevans]

Ariete!, on Tue 22 Dec 2009 1030, said:

Every 'colonial European' nation had its Little Big Horn. The Brits in Africa (more than once), Italy at Adwa and elsewhere. I'll bet there are a couple of French ones but I don't know them. They stemmed from racial arrogance (fighting savages) and usually occurred soon after said 'savages' got their hands on decent weaponry thereby reducing much of the vaunted superiority of the white folks.

Little Bighorn was not quite the same thing as Isandlwana or Adowa. The US Army had, by 1876, long experience fighting Indians. Custer was not at all typical. In fact, much of his myth is built on the assertion that he had to be a superior officer because he ws more aggressive and less methodical than men who had commanded infantry divisons and corps in the Civil War. But it was methodical campaigning, especially during the winters, when the Indians were at a severe logistical and cultural disadvantage, that won Indian wars, and the Army knew it.

[Tuccy]

Ariete!, on Tue 22 Dec 2009 1130, said:

Every 'colonial European' nation had its Little Big Horn. The Brits in Africa (more than once), Italy at Adwa and elsewhere. I'll bet there are a couple of French ones but I don't know them. They stemmed from racial arrogance (fighting savages) and usually occurred soon after said 'savages' got their hands on decent weaponry thereby reducing much of the vaunted superiority of the white folks.

Or by divided command and lack of sense of urgency (Isandhlwana) caused by underestimation...

[aevans]

Tuccy, on Tue 22 Dec 2009 1042, said:

Or by divided command and lack of sense of urgency (Isandhlwana) caused by underestimation...

But in the case of Custer, it wasn't an institutional disrespect for and underestimation of the enemy. It was almost entirely a product of his own personal ignorance and unwillingness to listen to good advice.

[Tuccy]

To my understanding at Isandhlwana it was also mostly personal ingorance (plus divided command), Lord Chelmsford left orders how to conduct defence in case of attack (generally "form square and volley fire") genrally the same, that he used later on in the campaign including the final battle but the competing commanders thought different and formed too stretched out line with gaps (not to mention hastily formed). Some individual companies later during the general rout formed rally squares and usually lasted longer (but fell in the end due to sheer numbers).

[aevans]

Tuccy, on Tue 22 Dec 2009 1217, said:

To my understanding at Isandhlwana it was also mostly personal ingorance (plus divided command)...

Perhaps, but in the US Army there wouldn't have been a debate about correct tactics. Remember also that at the Little Bighorn, the close presence of the enemy was no surprise, and many of the officers and NCOs had experience in fighting this particular enemy. In fact, the reason that Reno and Benteen's battalions survived was that they, unlike the British at Isandlwana, and unlike Custer, had no illusions about what worked and what didn't.

[Tuccy]

British Army also had plenty of seasoned NCOs and lower officers who knew what works about Screaming Hordes™, the institutional knowledge was there. But was disregarded on the spot the same way Custer did. It is true the British were surprised by quick appearance of the enemy, but they still had enough time to get into battle positions and shift thema atleast once on countermanding orders.

[Olof Larsson]

Tuccy, on Tue 22 Dec 2009 1317, said:

To my understanding at Isandhlwana it was also mostly personal ingorance (plus divided command), Lord Chelmsford left orders how to conduct defence in case of attack (generally "form square and volley fire") genrally the same, that he used later on in the campaign including the final battle but the competing commanders thought different and formed too stretched out line with gaps (not to mention hastily formed). Some individual companies later during the general rout formed rally squares and usually lasted longer (but fell in the end due to sheer numbers).

Or they could simply have listened to the Boers and established a laager.

The Britons at Rorke's drift did a lot better, thanks to their hasty fieldworks,
that allowed them to negate the numerical superiority of the Zulu's as long as they had munitions left
and shoulders that could stand the pain of such prolonged and intensive firing.

[aevans]

Tuccy, on Tue 22 Dec 2009 1242, said:

British Army also had plenty of seasoned NCOs and lower officers who knew what works about Screaming Hordes™, the institutional knowledge was there...

Actually, you're making my argument for me. The British had a generic pre-industrial enemy in mind, and a not too competent one. That's why there was a laissez faire attitude towards tactics. The US Army on the plains knew its enemy much more intimately. Please recall that at Isandlwana, there was one great military disaster, with many contributing human errors; at Little Bighorn there was a much smaller disaster, mostly the responsibility of one man in the wrong spot, and a costly but successful parallel battle, managed by many men who knew what they were doing.

[binder001]

In the Little Bighorn battle the US Army's familiarity with its enemy worked against it. Usually when confronted with a large formation of soldiers the Indians would prefer to melt away. The VC of the plains, only on horseback. Most Indians were warriors versus soldiers - brave and capable fighters but not subordinating themselves to a bigger effort. The Army would confront them, there would be combat and the native Americans would oten disappear. The one logic of Custer dividing his force was to reduce the enemy's avenues of escape. The idea was to dash in and force a surrender. Among his many errors were the rcial arrogance that the natives would continue to bug out when attacked by a strong mliitary force. He neglected to add in that these Indians were organized differently than in the past, that they were defending a village with women and children, and that they were present in greater numbers. Custers own battalion fell in divided groups. There was at least one unsupported counterattack by a troop. The command ended up dying in small groups. The legend of the missing Gatling guns keeps surfacing. Unless Custer could have established a position to fight from the guns wouldn't have helped that much. The Gatling was cumbersome and not much good in the running fight that took place. Originally used in an "artillery" role the guns needed to be sited with field of fire. The coulee country offered avenues of approach for small bands - there wasn't one screaming horde for the Gatlings to mow down. Still, a strong base of fire might have saved part of the command (until the black powder fouled the guns or they ran out of ammo). The troopers ween't that great on the shooting end of things, even when the carbines were working correctly.

So yes, arrogant ass versus victim of a plot.

[thekirk]

binder001, on Tue 22 Dec 2009 0849, said:

So yes, arrogant ass versus victim of a plot.

Mostly, I agree with everything you're saying. I also think there was an element of "Why the hell should we?" going on in Custer's command. Most of those officers who are being posthumously abused for not doing enough were victims of the Custer "clique" within the Seventh, and I don't think they were too highly motivated to take risks on his behalf, particularly since they'd had their advice ignored about how to conduct the mission.

Custer was not a frontier Army officer, had little experience fighting Indians, and kept trying to fit everything he was doing into the context of what he did know--the Civil War. Had he been fighting on another Civil War battlefield, his decisions might have made sense. They'd have probably been quite different, however--He respected the CSA cavalry he'd fought. He didn't respect the Plains Indians, or for that matter, know much about them.