[DesertFox]

I read that Long Beach shot down two Migs with Talos overland in Vietnam.

What other successes or failures were there with these missiles and how would they have done against P-15 Termit missile would they have been?

This post has been edited by DesertFox: 26 July 2007 - 1923 PM

[rmgill]

DesertFox, on Thu 26 Jul 2007 2015, said:

I read that Long Beach shot down two Migs with Talos overland in Vietnam.

What other successes or failures were there with these missiles and how would they have done against P-15 Termit missile would they have been?

The Long Beach shot down two migs from 80+ miles away. The Migs were orbiting over Hanoi. I think it bears expansion because of the sheer surprise that the MIG Pilots must have had.

[FITZ]

DesertFox, on Fri 27 Jul 2007 0015, said:

I read that Long Beach shot down two Migs with Talos overland in Vietnam.

What other successes or failures were there with these missiles and how would they have done against P-15 Termit missile would they have been?

Initial models just plain didn't work at all - recall the famous test witnessed by President Kennedy for example. By the mid-late 1960's they were reasonably reliable but already obsolete. Most ships that carried these weapons lacked NTDS and the systems themselves were vulnerable to saturation attacks. That was the whole rationale behind Typhon, which of course ended up being cancelled but in the end spawned the Aegis program. Aegis finally delivered a reliable weapon in a combat system that could deal with saturation attacks. It finally solved a problem that had plagued the Navy for 40 years.

[shep854]

rmgill, on Fri 27 Jul 2007 0615, said:

The Long Beach shot down two migs from 80+ miles away. The Migs were orbiting over Hanoi. I think it bears expansion because of the sheer surprise that the MIG Pilots must have had.

How'd they get those shots through the ROE?

[DesertFox]

FITZ, on Fri 27 Jul 2007 1114, said:

Initial models just plain didn't work at all - recall the famous test witnessed by President Kennedy for example. By the mid-late 1960's they were reasonably reliable but already obsolete. Most ships that carried these weapons lacked NTDS and the systems themselves were vulnerable to saturation attacks. That was the whole rationale behind Typhon, which of course ended up being cancelled but in the end spawned the Aegis program. Aegis finally delivered a reliable weapon in a combat system that could deal with saturation attacks. It finally solved a problem that had plagued the Navy for 40 years.

When did saturation attacks specifically become a problem?

[Olof Larsson]

DesertFox, on Fri 27 Jul 2007 0739, said:

When did saturation attacks specifically become a problem?

I'd say around Coral Sea or so.

The threat from AV-MF seems exaggerated thou.
AV-MF never had that many Backfires in the Northern Fleet,
availabilety was generaly low for Soviet birds (~50% I seem to recall)
and the CVBG had....5 layers* I figure between the Backfires bases
and the long range SAM's.

So I doubt that the AV-MF would be able to get enough AshM's throu to saturate USN SAM-systems.
Unless the CVBG's would be sent up north before decimating the Backfire-force.

(*)
- Offensive strike - I.E. USN Intruders, RAF Buccaneers, USAF Aardwarks, SAC etc.
- Warning at takeoff - SIGINT, Norwedian AF etc.
- GUIK-gap - E-3's, F-15's, F-4's, Tornado ADW etc.
- Naval interceptors
- Naval fighterbombers

[aevans]

shep854, on Fri 27 Jul 2007 1239, said:

How'd they get those shots through the ROE?

It was never against the ROE to shoot at enemy a/c over enemy territory. The problem was deconfliction and collateral damage to civilian a/c. I don't know the details of the engagement, but I would guess that the targets were flying in an area where no friendlies or civilian flights were at the time.

As for the perceived reliability of the Terrier system, the joke among the FCs on the Long Beach when I was aboard was that in the early days, enemy pilots were in greater danger of getting cooked by the fire control radars than they were of getting hit by the missiles.

[Ken Estes]

There was also the embarrassing incident where a MIG-17 bombed a FRAM I DD - USS Higbee - operating with DLG Sterrett in company and Sterrett was unable even to do a launch, let alone engage. I had always understood it that way, but thiswebsite claims one of two terriers fired scored a kill. I wonder if that was a feel-good add-on? I never knew that Oklahoma City was in company, a CLG. In all, not a good display of fleet AAW.

[Chris Werb]

Ken Estes, on Fri 27 Jul 2007 1641, said:

There was also the embarrassing incident where a MIG-17 bombed a FRAM I DD - USS Higbee - operating with DLG Sterrett in company and Sterrett was unable even to do a launch, let alone engage. I had always understood it that way, but thiswebsite claims one of two terriers fired scored a kill. I wonder if that was a feel-good add-on? I never knew that Oklahoma City was in company, a CLG. In all, not a good display of fleet AAW.

They bolted a Chapparral launcher on to one of the DDs after that one.

[shep854]

aevans, on Fri 27 Jul 2007 1458, said:

It was never against the ROE to shoot at enemy a/c over enemy territory. The problem was deconfliction and collateral damage to civilian a/c. I don't know the details of the engagement, but I would guess that the targets were flying in an area where no friendlies or civilian flights were at the time.

As for the perceived reliability of the Terrier system, the joke among the FCs on the Long Beach when I was aboard was that in the early days, enemy pilots were in greater danger of getting cooked by the fire control radars than they were of getting hit by the missiles.

I'm sure life was very interesting aboard the UN flights into NVN.

[FITZ]

DesertFox, on Fri 27 Jul 2007 1239, said:

When did saturation attacks specifically become a problem?

At least 1944. Remember that the "3-T" program was a response to the Kamikaze threat.

[DesertFox]

FITZ, on Fri 27 Jul 2007 1915, said:

At least 1944. Remember that the "3-T" program was a response to the Kamikaze threat.

I mean "Missile Saturation"

5 inch/38s and 3 inch guns did pretty good against the ones which leaked through the fighters......

[aevans]

DesertFox, on Fri 27 Jul 2007 1943, said:

I mean "Missile Saturation"

I'd say it was a real threat under certain circumstances by the late Sixties. Widespread acceptance of the threat probably happened in the early Seventies.

Quote

5 inch/38s and 3 inch guns did pretty good against the ones which leaked through the fighters......

A couple of things...

Gun count went down drastically throughout the Fifties and Sixties.

The missiles that were supposed to be more effective than the guns weren't very effective at all for several years even in low intensity engagements, to say nothing of massed attacks.

[Old Tanker]

How good was the Hawk system ?
They nearly had them bumper to bumper in the Fl. Keys during the Oct. '62 CMC

[gewing]

rmgill, on Thu 26 Jul 2007 2315, said:

The Long Beach shot down two migs from 80+ miles away. The Migs were orbiting over Hanoi. I think it bears expansion because of the sheer surprise that the MIG Pilots must have had.

iirc Talos was my favorite missile as a kid, reading the Colby books. :) That was a pretty impressive range, imo.

[FITZ]

DesertFox, on Fri 27 Jul 2007 1943, said:

I mean "Missile Saturation"

5 inch/38s and 3 inch guns did pretty good against the ones which leaked through the fighters......

The Navy apparently disagreed, since they went to the trouble of the 3-T program and regarded the existing AA systems as at best obsolescent by 1945.

[ShotMagnet]

I recall reading something as well that at least intimated that AAA was not particularly effective, since it could not score a point-kill with anything like certainty. Point-intercept weapons such as guided- and homing-missiles were therefore developed as a response to the saturation/suicide tactic.

Going only from memory, hoping someone will come along to augment/correct/amplify.


Shot

[FITZ]

ShotMagnet, on Fri 27 Jul 2007 2202, said:

I recall reading something as well that at least intimated that AAA was not particularly effective, since it could not score a point-kill with anything like certainty. Point-intercept weapons such as guided- and homing-missiles were therefore developed as a response to the saturation/suicide tactic.

Going only from memory, hoping someone will come along to augment/correct/amplify.
Shot

The navy saw its existing AAA weapons - the 20mm Oerlikon and 40mm Bofors - which had enjoyed so much success in 1942-43 as wholly inadequte to deal with the threat of 1944-45, in particular the Kamikaze. The 3"/50 and MK 63 and Mk 56 GFCS were part of the near-term solution, the 3"/70 twin more of the ultimate gun solution but to deal with post-war threats and speeds guns were just not going to be the answer. Hence 3-T.

[DesertFox]

aevans, on Fri 27 Jul 2007 1949, said:

I'd say it was a real threat under certain circumstances by the late Sixties. Widespread acceptance of the threat probably happened in the early Seventies.
A couple of things...

Gun count went down drastically throughout the Fifties and Sixties.

The missiles that were supposed to be more effective than the guns weren't very effective at all for several years even in low intensity engagements, to say nothing of massed attacks.

A couple of items, it was my understanding that guns simply did not have the tracking ability to target a fast moving missile such as the P-15 Termit so missiles were basically the only choice.

What went wrong with testing the missiles before putting them on operation naval vessels. I thought that was the reason we had test ships like the converted USS Mississippi?

[JohnAbrams21]

Who is this "Colby" and where can I find his books? Are they any good? Sorry if this is a bit off-topic. :(