[bad-dice]

I have a general question regarding the command methodology of current armies.

This is my take in broad terms of development over the last few centuries:

1. Traditional (can't think of a better term) where commanders at all levels operate to a set repertoire of manouvers and strict directions from above. E.G. the commander of wing in an 18th Century army.

2. Impulse where a commander of a corps or division will have a clearly defined order but it is left to him to set the formation and tactics of his own troops. E.G. French Napoleonic commanders and then most Western armies through to beyond WW2.

3. Mission where commanders of all levels are given a mission objective and left free to work out the best way to achieve it, higher authority limiting themselves to ensuring the subordinate stays within mission parameters and providing support. E.G. the German army from 1916(?).

In this forum we often discuss technical, tactical, strategic and even logistical aspects of campaigns, but to my knowledge have never considered them in the context of command methodologies. This I think adds a further dimension and should be considered, for instance the British in the Western Desert during ' 41 and the early to mid ' 42 constantly got a bloody nose trying to compete with Rommel at open manouver type warfare, but their command and control just could not match the Germans mission based orders for speed of action and speed in reaction. When Monty took over they never again tried this and only ever engaged the Germans in set piece battles in which they excelled, and consequently generally beat the Germans after this time. A similar process of events took place on the eastern front where after '42 the Germans were only really successful in counterpunches to breakthroughs that occurred after set piece Russians offensives.

Do you agree with my broad analysis? Do all armies now use mission based orders? When did they adopt them?

[aevans]

I suppose you're more or less right in general outline, but some of the details are a bit off. Though some room for initiative existed in most 19th Century armies the initial tactical formation was set at the Corps level, except in close terrain, and the entire corps usually conformed to the same mission and axis of advance. Also, when given latitude to maneuver, divisions still often adopted stereoptyped formations whenever possible. During the Napoleonic Wars, for example, the Fench often adopted a two line formation, while the Prussians had a thee line one. Deploying divisions in two lines as a matter of standard practice persisted at least through the American Civil War.

[Wobbly Head]

With new technology involving GPS systems and computer mapping tied into encripted radio/data systems. Manovers are going to be more liking to playing a RTS game for a comander giving a whole new meaning to the phrase "micro managed to death."

[WRW]

Wobbly Head, on Mon 25 Jul 2005 0424, said:

With new technology involving GPS systems and computer mapping tied into encripted radio/data systems. Manovers are going to be more liking to playing a RTS game for a comander  giving a whole new meaning to the phrase "micro managed to death."

I (unfortunately sometimes) spend a lot of my working day working with non military C&C systems and related technology.

A couple of things make me nervous - a lot of people (who maybe should know) do not know the capability of existing technology in this field and the urge to micro manage is so strong that very often I think the best way to elimintae it is by gene therapy or as an alternative - a base ball bat

WRW

[Zipperhead]

IMO it is exactly the fear of micro-management that has held up the development/acceptance of land C2 systems to our disadvantage. I call it the Big Brother syndrome, and to be honest I've yet to see these fears actualized.

Let's not forget the Navy has had functional C2 systems since the 60's, the air force also has been subject to this type of scrutiny, Commanders have not played pupet master with them why would one assume that it would or could be done with the army?

The people with these systems sitting back in HQ were also field commanders at one point. They know they can not see the ground, they are smart enough to realize that there is no effective way to command from afar on the basis of a computer generated display. To be honest I'd really like to see an example of this micro-management. I think it is a combat legend or a very rare occurance at worst.

[aevans]

Zipperhead, on Mon 25 Jul 2005 1245, said:

IMO it is exactly the fear of micro-management that has held up the development/acceptance of land C2 systems to our disadvantage. I call it the Big Brother syndrome, and to be honest I've yet to see these fears actualized.

Let's not forget the Navy has had functional C2 systems since the 60's, the air force also has been subject to this type of scrutiny, Commanders have not played pupet master with them why would one assume that it would or could be done with the army?

The people with these systems sitting back in HQ were also field commanders at one point. They know they can not see the ground, they are smart enough to realize that there is no effective way to command from afar on the basis of a computer generated display. To be honest I'd really like to see an example of this micro-management. I think it is a combat legend or a very rare occurance at worst.

During the Vietnam war it was not at all uncommon for a platoon or company firefight to have the battalion commander on the radio net (okay so far), the brigade commander in a helicopter above the battle, the division commander in a helicopter above him, and sometimes even the corps commander somewhere in the mix. They didn't even need a tactical internet to do this, just enough FM radios. This was arguably a symptom of counterguerilla operations; IOW, too much army fighting too little war on any given day, but when you consider the type of battles that we are likely to fight in the future, is it not the shape of things to come?

Even with all of the simultaneous action going on in the initial stage of OIF, I sometimes wonder if the much commented necessity of using Iridium for tactical communications wasn't a blessing in disguise. After all, it did limit the number of people that a division commander could bother to 50-60, and then only one at a time.

This post has been edited by aevans: 25 July 2005 - 0902 AM

[MDFeingold]

In Rick Atkinson's book about the 101st Air Assault Division in OIF, "In the Company of Soldiers," he mentions the division commander personally controlling attack helicopter strikes. The author does not discuss the conduct in depth, and there is nothing from which the reader can discern whether the division CO's involvement had a positive or negative effect. Either way, I would characterize this as micromanagement.

[Scott Cunningham]

The US Army is drifting towards a C2 method I would call "Oversynch" in which digital C2 systems allow unit commanders up to division level to manuever their 'pawns' across the chessboard. It is ineffective. The SAMS school, and FBCB2 or BLUEFORCE Tracker is making this disturbing possibility a reality.

Digital C2 systems need to be focused on freeing up lower unit commanders (much like radios did for the Wehrmacht) rather than provide higher unit commanders additional opportunities to micromanage his units.

[SCFalken]

Some please define "Set Piece" for me, I have heard wayyyy too many conflicting definitions.



Falken

[SCFalken]

Wobbly Head, on Mon 25 Jul 2005 0424, said:

With new technology involving GPS systems and computer mapping tied into encripted radio/data systems. Manovers are going to be more liking to playing a RTS game for a comander  giving a whole new meaning to the phrase "micro managed to death."

CG: "1st/63rd AR, ZERG RUSH!!!"


Falken

[EchoFiveMike]

Quote

The people with these systems sitting back in HQ were also field commanders at one point. They know they can not see the ground, they are smart enough to realize that there is no effective way to command from afar on the basis of a computer generated display. To be honest I'd really like to see an example of this micro-management. I think it is a combat legend or a very rare occurance at worst.

Re-read my posts from Iraq. Although I agree that WAY too much precious sat uplink/downlink bandwidth is being consumed by HQ elements that are absolutely useless and add nothing to the fight. "Read Not a Good Day to Die" to get an idea of the useless lateral command structure we tend towards. Pick 50-75% of officers over O5 at random and retire them. S/F....Ken M

This post has been edited by EchoFiveMike: 25 July 2005 - 1309 PM

[Scott Cunningham]

I am at Ft Irwin right now and just fought 3 battles against a 4th Gen unit. All the fancy C2 stuff did them little good. They should have been VERY fast to react (if they had pushed info/intel down), but instead were abnormally slow. We had little trouble maneuvering within their decision cycles.

Oversimplification of course, and this C2 stuff was not the only factor, but it certainly played a part.

[Ivanhoe]

Zipperhead, on Mon 25 Jul 2005 0845, said:

Let's not forget the Navy has had functional C2 systems since the 60's, the air force also has been subject to this type of scrutiny, Commanders have not played pupet master with them why would one assume that it would or could be done with the army?

My understanding is that, at least in the US military, the commander of a vessel and the PIC of an aircraft have final authority, which offers greater latitude than ground units.

In some book I read on Vietnam, it might have been "Hunters and Shooters", a story is told wherein a saenior NCO in command of a ground element ignored the orders from an officer orbiting above, and the courts martial quickly determined the NCO was in the clear. What was remarkable about the story was that few involved were aware of the reg establishing final authority.

[aegandolfi]

Zipperhead, on Mon 25 Jul 2005 0845, said:

The people with these systems sitting back in HQ were also field commanders at one point. They know they can not see the ground, they are smart enough to realize that there is no effective way to command from afar on the basis of a computer generated display. To be honest I'd really like to see an example of this micro-management. I think it is a combat legend or a very rare occurance at worst.

Well, the first example that came to my mind was the bit from Somalia, as portrayed in Black Hawk Down, where the convoy is trying to reach a downed chopper. Instead of just saying the crash site is four blocks north and two blocks east (or whatever it was) the commanders hovering overhead were giving detailed driving directions to the CO on the ground, eg "turn left now", which he had to relay to his driver, which were too late to actually turn. So the convoy ended up going in circles, getting shot up, and having to retire without reaching the chopper.

Just an example from literature, as I don't have personal mititary experience.

ag

[bad-dice]

It is interesting that Moltke started the process of lower level control within an overall strategic plan/framework, because armies were growing beyond the point where a general on horseback could control them. Modern technology is giving generals the means to now achieve that control, and it is probably inevitable and natural that they try to do so.

It would be interesting to know what direction the Germans and Israelis are currently moving in.

[aevans]

bad-dice, on Sat 30 Jul 2005 1705, said:

It is interesting that Moltke started the process of lower level control within an overall strategic plan/framework, because armies were growing beyond the point where a general on horseback could control them. Modern technology is giving generals the means to now achieve that control, and it is probably inevitable and natural that they try to do so.

It would be interesting to know what direction the Germans and Israelis are currently moving in.

I think Moltke was philosophically inclined to mission orders and optional control. But in practice his instrument was terribly suited to such methods. The Prussian victory at Koniggratz was an accident of operational deployment. (Yes, I know we have long been taught that the Prussians did it that way on purpose, but it's pretty much undisputed that their logistics capabilities demanded a dispersed deployment along the frontier.) Likewise, Gravelotte-St. Privat was an unalloyed tactical disaster, largely caused by incompetent corps and division commanders, redeemed only by the fact that the French had already lost operationally before a single shot was fired.

[bad-dice]

aevans, on Sun 31 Jul 2005 0302, said:

I think Moltke was philosophically inclined to mission orders and optional control. But in practice his instrument was terribly suited to such methods. The Prussian victory at Koniggratz was an accident of operational deployment. (Yes, I know we have long been taught that the Prussians did it that way on purpose, but it's pretty much undisputed that their logistics capabilities demanded a dispersed deployment along the frontier.) Likewise, Gravelotte-St. Privat was an unalloyed tactical disaster, largely caused by incompetent corps and division commanders, redeemed only by the fact that the French had already lost operationally before a single shot was fired.

I would agree, and additionally add that Molke was thinking only of army and corps commanders. The system in use at that time worked well at Tannenberg with Hoffman's initiative being decisive, but not so well with Kluck and Bulow deciding amongst themselves to scrap the Schleiffen plan on the Marne. Kluck and Bulow were not being provided with any direction by the younger Moltke and it can be argued this actually shows the strength of the method in that they reached the Marne while their overall commander had turned to jelly.

The practice giving junior commanders mission based orders and allowing them the initiative to act on them was fully embraced on the Western front when Lossburg saw it as the way to make “flexible defence” workable, and Ludendorf saw that the “rigid defence” adopted in the Somme battles was ruinous so implemented flexible defence as the German standard.

I find 1918 interesting because the Germans used the system in attack allowing small units to infiltrate through defences, but had not managed to train their whole army to act that way. And the British while trying to learn from the German defensive arrangements copied the “blob defence” tactics but still tried to rigidly control the actions of the lower level defence.

[Ken Estes]

There are detailed orders, and mission-type orders; I see no discrete instance of 'impulse', which could naturally occur in either type. It is the character of the commander and the intervening commanders, the service doctrine and the state of training of the troops that will dictate how these are accomplished. Interestingly, the reading of the operations orders will give little insight, although the maneuverist pundits and their imitators place great store in the use of a paragraph for 'commander's intent' also known as 'desired end-state' to distinguish the modern mission type order. In absence of the requirements for Auftragstaktik, they will still be detailed orders. Thanks to the technical advances and the desire to 'synchronize' [mentioned above] and an even scarier technique, the 'templating' of op plans -- a method that could be applied to the French in early 20th C, USSR in mid20th C and now the US Army and its imitators -- we will have real problems finding Auftragstaktik, and instead we will find 'helicopter syndrome' [VN era, now satelite or real-time display syndrome] . Thus we have both styles available at the same time, maybe in the same commander.

How can one leave the details of execution to a subordinate, when the technical aids allow the senior commander at the theater level [and above] the capability to adjust the formation of the right squad/platoon of the right company/battalion/brigade/division?

Mission orders can be done, but will require the utmost in restraint and the confidence in the service's doctrine, training and the personalities of the commanders to uphold a true mission-oriented atmosphere. So, we are already talking about a matter of ambience, not the system of command and control, which remains high tech, detailed and comprehensive. For instance, when fire support goes to the desired 'sensor-to-shooter' this implies mission oriented execution, yet the inevitable parameters and protocols [read ROEs] introduced into the system by the command will amount to detailed orders.

War is simple, except in its execution....

[KingSargent]

We have touched on this idea, especially when talking about France 1940.

The Germans used the mission statement, while the French used a doctrine called colmatage, which was carefully planned and rehearsed set-piece battle using coordinated artillery support. This had worked for them in 1918 and the results of earlier battles which had not been planned in detail were bloody enough that the French adopted colmatage with relief.

However, colmatage didn't work once the opponent had gotten inside your decision cycle. In 1940, the French commanders could not react quickly enough to counter German thrusts. When the Allies were falling back from the Dyle line, troops would move into a new defensive position as ordered, only to find the Gremans had already passed it and were in their rear. After a generation of training for a set-piece battle, the commanders just couldn't think fast or 'shoot from the hip.'

To be fair to the French lots of others had the colmatage idea, including many of the Germans - especially the ones who got upset and tried to stop Guderian.

The French never caught on to the disadvantages of their doctrine because their training was rehearsed and formalized, and the annual maneuvers were not war-games so much as playlets designed to let the conscripts see how well it worked. Colmatage was fine as long as both sides used it but it was outclassed by the German Auftragstaktik.